Bava Metzia 189
עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב יחדו
unless the verse had explicitly stated 'together'!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the waw implies both conjunction and separation, and in the absence of an explicit statement to the contrary it is assumed to connote separation. v. Sanh. 85b. Hence, in his view the 'or' is unnecessary, and may teach the inclusion of capture; but in R. Joshia's view it is necessary, and so the question remains. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
אפילו תימא ר' יאשיה לחלק הכא לא צריך מ"ט סברא הוא מה לי קטלה כולה מה לי קטלה פלגא
— You may say so even according to R. Joshia: it [sc. 'or'] is unnecessary here for the purpose of separation. Why? It is a matter of logic: what is the difference whether it is wholly killed or only partly?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For an injury is the equivalent of partial death, with respect to the value of the animal. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
גניבה ואבידה בשואל מנא לן
Whence do we know that a borrower is responsible for theft and loss? And should you say, It follows from injury and death: [I would rejoin,] as for these, [he is responsible] because it is impossible to take the trouble of finding it again;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the loss is absolute. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
וכ"ת נילף משבורה ומתה מה לשבורה ומתה דלא אפשר למיטרח ואתויי תאמר בגניבה ואבידה דאפשר למיטרח ואתויי
will you then say [the same] in the case of theft and loss, seeing that with trouble it may be found?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence it may be argued that the owner must seek them, and the borrower is free from liability. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
אלא כי הא דתניא (שמות כב, יג) ונשבר או מת אין לי אלא שבורה ומתה גניבה ואבידה מנין אמרת קל וחומר ומה שומר שכר שפטור משבורה ומתה חייב בגניבה ואבידה שואל שחייב בשבורה ומתה אינו דין שחייב בגניבה ואבידה וזה הוא קל וחומר שאין עליו תשובה
— But [it may be derived] even as it has been taught: [And if a man borrow aught of his neighbour,] and it be hurt, or die — from this I know [the law] only for injury and death: whence do I know it for theft and loss? — You can reason a <i>minori</i>: if a paid bailee, who is not responsible for injury and death, is nevertheless liable for theft and loss; then a borrower, who is liable for the former, is surely liable for the latter too! And this is an a <i>minori</i> argument which cannot be refuted. Why state that it 'cannot be refuted'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The emphatic assertion suggests that the Tanna has a particular refutation in mind, but maintains that it is false. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
מאי אין עליו תשובה וכ"ת איכא למיפרך מה לשומר שכר שכן משלם תשלומי כפל בטוען טענת לסטים מזויין
— For should you object, It may be refuted, thus: as for a paid bailee, [he is responsible for theft and loss] because he must make restitution of twice the principal [if discovered] in a [false] plea of [loss through] an armed robber,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra. The same holds good here. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
איבעית אימא קסבר לסטים מזויין גזלן הוא
is a greater severity. Alternatively, he maintains that an armed robber is a gazlan.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'robber', who robs by open violence and is not subject to the twofold payment (v. B.K. 79b), as distinct from gannab, a thief who steals in secret. Consequently, the punishment of twofold payment does not apply to a paid bailee who falsely pleads an attack by an armed robber. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
אלא גמר משומר שכר ושומר שכר גופיה מנלן גמרי חיובא דשומר שכר מחיובא דשואל מה להלן בבעלים פטור אף כאן בבעלים פטור
whence do we know freedom from liability?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of theft or loss, when the owner of the bailment has lent his personal service too. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
במאי גמר אי במה מצינו איכא למיפרך כדפרכינן שכן אונס
And should you say, It is deduced from injury and death: [it might be argued,] as for these, [he is free] because they are unavoidable accidents? — But it follows from a paid bailee. And whence do we know it of a paid bailee himself? — The liability of a paid bailee is equated to that of a borrower: just as there, when the owner is lent for personal service, he [sc. the borrower] is free thereof, so here too [in the case of a paid bailee], when the owner is lent for personal service, he is free thereof. How is this deduced? If by analogy,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H] Lit., 'what (do) we find?' i.e., as we find a paid bailee and a borrower responsible for certain mishaps, and we also find that the former ceases to be responsible when the owner of the bailment is personally in his service, so the same is assumed of the latter. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
אלא אמר קרא (שמות כב, יג) וכי ישאל וי"ו מוסיף על ענין ראשון וילמד עליון מתחתון
that may be refuted, as [in fact] we have refuted it, since they [sc. injury etc.] are accidents!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whereas theft is not so unpreventable. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
ואכתי שואל משומר שכר לא גמר דאיכא למיפרך מה לשומר שכר שכן פטור בשבורה ומתה תאמר בשואל שחייב בשבורה ומתה
— But Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow': the <i>waw</i> [copulative 'and'] indicates conjunction with<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'adds to'. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
אלא גניבה ואבידה בשואל לחיובא מנלן דגמר משומר שכר דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון מה גניבה ואבידה דשומר שכר בבעלים פטור אף גניבה ואבידה דשואל נמי בבעלים פטור
the preceding subject, and the upper section is determined by the lower.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H]. I.e., the waw indicates that the provisions of each section, in part at least, apply to the other. Hence, since the lower states that a borrower is exempt when the owner lends his personal service, the same holds good in the upper section dealing with a paid trustee. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
הניחא למאן דאית ליה דיו אלא למאן דלית ליה דיו מאי איכא למימר
But even so, [the law of] a borrower cannot be deduced from [that of] a paid bailee, since it [the similarity] may be refuted. As for a paid bailee, that [sc. his non-liability for theft when the owner is in his service] is because he is exempt in the case of injury and death: will you say the same of a borrower, who is liable for these? — But [reason this]: Whence do we know that a borrower is liable for theft and loss [at all]? [Is it not] because we deduce it from a paid bailee?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As stated supra. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
אלא אמר קרא וכי ישאל וי"ו מוסיף על ענין ראשון וילמד עליון מתחתון ותחתון מעליון
Then it is sufficient that the conclusion of an a <i>minori</i> proposition shall be as its premise: just as theft and loss in the case of a paid bailee, when the owner is in his service, impose no liability; so also with respect to theft and loss in the case of a borrower, when the owner is in his service there is no responsibility. Now, that is well on the view that we accept this limitation;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'that agrees (that we say), Dayyo, it is sufficient.' v. B.K. 25a. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
איתמר פשיעה בבעלים פליגי בה רב אחא ורבינא חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור
but on the view that rejects it, what can you say? — But [answer thus]: Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow': the '<i>waw</i>' indicates conjunction with the preceding subject, and so the lower section illumines the upper and is itself illumined thereby.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence, just as a borrower is free from responsibility when the owner is in his service, where he would otherwise be liable, sc. for injury and death, so the paid bailee is free in similar circumstances where he would otherwise be liable, viz., for theft and loss. And just as a paid bailee is not responsible in these cases, so likewise a borrower. Now, since the whole is thus deduced by analogy, it is not subject to refutation. But above, only the first half was deduced by analogy (hekkesh, v. Glos.), the second half being derived a minori; and an a minori reasoning (Kal wa-homer, v. Glos.) is subject to refutation. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
מ"ד חייב קסבר מקרא נדרש לפניו ולא לפני פניו
It has been stated: When there is culpable negligence [on the part of an unpaid bailee], and the owner is in [his service] — R. Aha and Rabina dispute therein: One maintains that he is liable; the other that he is exempt. He who rules that he is liable maintains that a Scriptural verse may be interpreted [as applying] to the immediately preceding subject, but not to the one anterior thereto: consequently, But if the owner thereof be with it, etc.,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Mentioned in the case of borrower. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
הלכך אם בעליו עמו אשומר חנם לא כתיב ופשיעה נמי בשומר שכר ובשואל לא כתיב הלכך בשומר שכר ובשואל לחיוב אתיא בקל וחומר משומר חנם
does not refer to a gratuitous bailee;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is two sections remote from the borrower. ');"><sup>20</sup></span>
אבל בבעלים לפטור אף בשומר שכר ובשואל לא מ"ט כי כתיב אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם אשואל ואשומר שכר אהנך חיובי דכתיב בהו בהדיא הוא דמיכתב
on the other hand, negligence [as a cause of liability] is not stated in connection with a paid bailee and a borrower. Therefore, liability [for negligence] in the case of the paid bailee and borrower too follows a <i>minori</i> from a gratuitous bailee. But that there should be no liability for it, when the owner is in their service, that cannot be maintained even in respect of a paid bailee and a borrower.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Notwithstanding that in cases of mishaps this fact does free them from liability. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>
מ"ד פטור קסבר מקרא נדרש לפניו ולפני פניו וכי כתיב אם בעליו עמו אשומר חנם נמי כתיב
Why so? Because when Scripture states in respect of a borrower and a paid bailee,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The first explicitly, and the second by exegesis. ');"><sup>22</sup></span>
תנן השואל הפרה ושאל בעליה עמה השואל הפרה ושכר בעליה עמה שאל בעליה או שכרן ואחר כך שאל הפרה ומתה פטור ואילו ש"ח לא קתני
But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good, it refers only to those cases of liability which are explicitly stated.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But not for negligence, the liability for which is derived a minori. ');"><sup>23</sup></span>
ולטעמיך ש"ש מי קתני
Whilst he who maintains that he is not responsible, is of the opinion that the verse may be interpreted as bearing upon the preceding subject and the one anterior thereto; hence, when it is stated, But if the owner thereof [etc.], it refers to a gratuitous bailee too.
אלא תנא מילתא
We learnt: IF A MAN BORROWS A COW AND BORROWS ITS OWNER WITH IT, OR BORROWS A COW<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [This phrase does not occur in our Mishnah but is introduced by the Talmud in the text to exclude the possible assumption that the reference here is to the hiring of the cow. V. Strashun, a.l.] ');"><sup>24</sup></span> AND HIRES THE OWNER WITH IT, OR IF HE FIRST BORROWS OR HIRES THE OWNER AND THEN BORROWS THE COW, AND IT DIES, HE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE. But a gratuitous bailee is not mentioned!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which proves that the service of the owner does not free him where he would otherwise be responsible, viz., in the case of culpable negligence, thus refuting the contrary view. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> — But even on your reasoning, is then a paid bailee mentioned?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though all agree that he is exempt from his liabilities if the owner is in his service. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> Hence [it must be said,] the Tanna states [only] what